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INTRODUCTION
1

2

3

Saving Our Sons, Raising Boys’ Achievement, The Male Minority,
4
and Where the Boys Aren’t: a look in a newspaper, magazine, or
5
local bookstore reveals these titles and more. Females currently
constitute approximately fifty-seven percent of students on college
6
campuses nationwide, and the Department of Education predicts
that this gender gap will increase to nearly sixty percent female by
7
2010. Instead of cause for celebration, this lack of proportionality
1. MICHAEL GURIAN & KATHY STEVENS, THE MINDS OF BOYS: SAVING OUR SONS
FROM FALLING BEHIND IN SCHOOL AND LIFE (2005).
2. RAISING BOYS’ ACHIEVEMENT IN SCHOOLS (Kevan Bleach ed., 1998).
3. Daren Fonda, The Male Minority, TIME.COM, Dec. 2, 2000, http://www.time.
com/time/education/article/0,8599,90446,00.html.
4. Melana Zyla Vickers, Where the Boys Aren’t: The Gender Gap on College Campuses,
THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 1, 2006.
5. See Sarah Karnasiewicz, The Campus Crusade for Guys, SALON.COM, Feb. 15,
2006, http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2006/02/15/affirmative_action/index_
np.html (explaining the wave of recent commentary about the war on boys, where
commentators criticize the education system’s ability to educate boys effectively).
6. Mary Beth Marklein, College Gender Gap Widens: 57% Are Women, USA TODAY,
Oct. 20, 2005, at 1A; see U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.: NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., GENDER
DIFFERENCES IN PARTICIPATION AND COMPLETION OF UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION AND
HOW THEY HAVE CHANGED OVER TIME iii (2005), available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2005/2005169.pdf (explaining that the percentage of female undergraduates
increased from forty-two percent to fifty-six percent from 1970 to 2001).
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 36, 125 (2006),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006071.pdf (stating that the gender gap
among undergraduate college students is expected to continue increasing through
2015).
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has become a source of concern for admissions officers and news
9
commentators.
Growing concern over this gender gap has led some colleges to
10
give male students an edge in the admissions process. For example,
the University of Georgia (“UGA”) implemented an affirmative
11
action policy that awarded additional points to male applicants.
However, when challenged, UGA’s policy was declared
12
unconstitutional. Additionally, in March 2006, an admissions officer
from Kenyon College published an op-ed article in the New York
Times about the impact the gender gap has on the admissions
13
process.
She declared that because of demographic concerns,
admissions committees consider males more valuable candidates than

8. See Jennifer Delahunty Britz, Op-Ed., To All the Girls I’ve Rejected, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2006, at A25 (describing how the admissions committee’s concerns about
the gender gap led to the determination that male candidates are more valuable
than female candidates).
9. See, e.g., Karnasiewicz, supra note 5 (“On the one hand, you want to embrace
the success of women . . . . Yet, as more and more women substitute careers for
having babies, I’ve come to see that we’re looking at a population crisis.”); Jennifer
Olney, Concern Grows Over College Gender Gap, ABC7NEWS.COM, Apr. 3, 2006,
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=assignment_7&id=4036900 (arguing that
boys start to fall behind in elementary school and that those who do go to college do
not receive the assistance given to their female peers). But see Tamar Lewin, A More
Nuanced Look at Men, Women and College, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2006, at B8 (noting that
the gender gap disappears among applicants from the highest income levels, and
that the size of the gap may be due to the increased representation of women among
older college students where women outnumber men two to one).
10. See Tamar Lewin, At Colleges, Women Are Leaving Men in the Dust, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2006, at A1 (quoting the Vice President for Enrollment at Dickinson College
who explained “The secret of getting some gender balance is that once men apply,
you’ve got to admit them. So did we bend a little? Yeah, at the margin, we
did . . . .”). But see Sandy Baum & Eban Goodstein, Gender Imbalance in College
Applications: Does it Lead to a Preference for Men in the Admissions Process?, 24 ECON. OF
EDUC. REV. 665, 674 (2005) (concluding that the preference for male students
becomes statistically significant only when the applicant pool is extremely
unbalanced). See generally Delahunty Britz, supra note 8, at A25 (concluding that “in
this day and age of swollen applicant pools that are decidedly female . . . [t]he fat
acceptance envelope is simply more elusive for today’s accomplished young
women”).
11. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d
1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (describing UGA’s admissions policy that awarded each
male applicant an additional 0.25 points to his admission index), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234
(11th Cir. 2001).
12. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (holding that the affirmative action
policy that awarded preferences based on gender and race violated both Title VI and
Title IX); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson II), 263 F.3d
1234, 1242 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming the decision of the district court; however,
since the parties only appealed on the basis of the racial preference, the court did
not discuss the gender-based affirmative action plan).
13. See Delahunty Britz, supra note 8, at A25 (stating that one of the unintended
consequences of the women’s movement is increased competition for women in
undergraduate admissions).
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14

females. While many college administrators do not openly admit to
implementing male affirmative action policies, evidence suggests
that, in certain circumstances, admissions officers give males an edge
15
in the admissions process. In addition, many colleges have begun
16
targeted campaigns to lure more males to campus.
This comment evaluates the constitutionality of affirmative action
policies that benefit male students. Part I sets out background
information about potential causes of action and remedies for female
students who challenge affirmative action policies that benefit male
17
students. Section A discusses the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the development of the law regarding
universities’ use of racial affirmative action policies. Section B
discusses potential remedies under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) and the similarity between Title IX
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VI”). Section C discusses
state remedies available to students under educational equity statutes,
human rights laws, and state equal rights amendments.
Part II begins with a discussion of the relevant distinctions between
racial affirmative action policies and affirmative action policies
benefiting male applicants and sets forth a proposed framework to
analyze male affirmative action policies. This Comment concludes
that affirmative action policies benefiting males are unconstitutional
because of colleges’ reliance on gender stereotypes when
implementing them and because there is a lack of evidence to
support a legitimate pedagogical objective for the use of such
programs.

14. See id. (apologizing for the “demographic realities” that result in more
rejection letters being sent to female students).
15. See Mark Clayton, Admissions Officers Walk a Fine Line in Gender-Balancing Act,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 2001, at 11 (stating that in recent years the Office
for Civil Rights of the Department of Education has received about twenty
complaints each year about gender discrimination in the admissions process); Alex
Kingsbury, Admit It: Women Have a Man Problem, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 28,
2006 (explaining that some colleges have skewed acceptance rates for male and
female students, including William and Mary where the acceptance rate for males
was forty-three percent while the acceptance rate for females was thirty-one percent).
16. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 15 (explaining that admissions officers
aggressively pursue interviews with male candidates); Karnasiewicz, supra note 5
(noting that someone speaks about male recruitment efforts at the National
Association of College Admission Counseling’s national conference each year).
17. Because of the standing requirement, women who applied for admission to a
college with an affirmative action plan benefiting males and were subsequently
rejected, would have the requisite “personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s
allegedly unlawful conduct [that is] likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Affirmative Action Policies
The Equal Protection Clause provides one method of redress for
female students to challenge affirmative action policies that benefit
18
While the Supreme Court has addressed the
male students.
constitutionality of race-based affirmative action programs, the Court
has not yet ruled on the issue of gender-based affirmative action
19
policies. This Section first provides an overview of the Supreme
Court decisions analyzing racial affirmative action policies. It then
reviews the Court’s gender jurisprudence under the Equal Protection
Clause because these cases provide a more appropriate framework to
analyze the gender affirmative action programs benefiting male
students.
1. The Equal Protection Clause and race-based affirmative action cases
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
declares that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its
20
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Supreme Court
interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate only state action,
21
which places private discrimination beyond its reach. Therefore,
under the Equal Protection Clause females can only challenge public
colleges’ affirmative action policies that benefit male students.
The Supreme Court applies different standards of review to analyze
policies that discriminate against individuals based on certain
22
characteristics.
The Court recognizes race as a suspect

18. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that classifications
based on gender violate the Equal Protection Clause unless they are substantially
related to an important government objective).
19. See Scott Jaschik, Affirmative Action for Men, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Mar. 27, 2006,
http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/03/27/admit (noting that the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of gender-based affirmative action
policies in higher education institutions).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment “erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful” (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 n.12
(1948))); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment.”).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(using strict scrutiny to evaluate state policies that discriminate against individuals on
the basis of race); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (using intermediate scrutiny to analyze
challenges based on gender discrimination).
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23

classification and applies strict scrutiny to evaluate policies that
discriminate against individuals based on this immutable
24
characteristic. Strict scrutiny is also used to evaluate programs that
25
benefit racial minorities, including racial affirmative action policies.
To be constitutional, a policy that discriminates against individuals on
the basis of race must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
26
government interest.
The Supreme Court has addressed universities’ use of racial
27
affirmative action policies on numerous occasions. The Court first
28
addressed this issue in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.
In that case, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for the
university to reserve a fixed number of seats in the incoming class for
29
racial minorities; however, the Court expressed approval for the use
of race as one factor that admissions officers could consider when
30
The Court recognized that offering
evaluating applicants.
admission to students with different racial backgrounds constitutes
only part of achieving diversity and that using racial quotas to achieve
31
diversity could undermine this goal.

23. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (suggesting that there may be a need
for a more searching judicial inquiry when statutes disadvantage discrete and insular
minorities).
24. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (concluding that “all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect”).
25. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (holding that the
standard of review does not change based on whether the policy harms or benefits
racial minorities since without such judicial scrutiny it is impossible to determine
which classifications are “remedial and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority”).
26. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (holding that the
university’s asserted goal of diversity must constitute a compelling state interest and
that the affirmative action plan must be narrowly tailored to achieve that objective).
27. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
28. 438 U.S. at 276-78 (explaining that the University of California Davis Medical
School rejected Bakke, a white male, and that Bakke then alleged that the school’s
affirmative action policy violated the Equal Protection Clause).
29. See id. at 319 (rejecting the use of racial quotas because students who do not
belong to the class of racial minorities are “never afforded the chance to compete
with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats”).
30. See id. at 316-17 (expressing approval for the admissions programs at Harvard
and Princeton, which allowed an applicant’s race to be used as a “plus” in his or her
admissions file); id. at 314 (noting that while universities have wide discretion in
deciding which students to admit, individual rights may not be disregarded).
31. See id. at 315 (explaining that the state’s compelling interest in diversity
includes admitting students with a range of talents, interests, and qualifications
rather than admitting students based solely on their race).
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More recently, the Court addressed the issue of racial affirmative
32
33
action programs in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. In
Grutter, the Court considered the constitutionality of the University of
Michigan Law School’s affirmative action policy to enroll a “critical
mass” of racial minorities in order to foster diversity in the incoming
34
class.
The Court held that diversity in a law school setting
35
constituted a compelling state interest, and that the affirmative
action policy was narrowly tailored because it conducted an
36
individualized evaluation of each student’s application.
While the Court upheld the law school’s affirmative action policy in
Grutter, in Gratz it found the program used by the undergraduate
37
institution unconstitutional.
The Court accepted the goal of
38
diversity as a compelling state interest; however, the program failed
the narrowly tailored prong because the policy awarded twenty points
39
to every minority applicant based solely on his or her race. Both
Grutter and Gratz emphasize the need for colleges to conduct
40
individualized evaluations of each applicant. While schools may use
32. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The University of Michigan Law School rejected
Grutter, a white female; although a racial minority with a similar LSAT score and
GPA would have been admitted. Id. at 316-17.
33. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Gratz and Hamacher both applied to the University of
Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. Id. at 244. The university
rejected them even though the admissions committee found Gratz to be wellqualified and Hamacher to be qualified for admission. Id.
34. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315-16 (explaining that the law school seeks to enroll a
critical mass of students who belong to an ethnic group subject to a history of
discrimination because these students make unique contributions to the law school
environment).
35. See id. at 328-29 (according great deference to the law school’s determination
that diversity contributed to the accomplishment of the school’s mission by creating
livelier classroom discussions). But cf. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1070 (2006)
(explaining that there is some controversy regarding whether diversity is actually a
compelling state interest in educational institutions).
36. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36 (holding that even though the school tried to
enroll a critical mass of minority students, this did not constitute a quota because
“‘[s]ome attention to numbers,’ without more, does not transform a flexible
admissions system into a rigid quota” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 323 (1989))).
37. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76 (holding that the rigid point system used by the
university violated the Equal Protection Clause).
38. See id. at 268-69 (referencing the Court’s analysis in Grutter, which deferred to
the school’s educational judgment).
39. Id. at 273-74; see also id. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that
the number of points awarded to minority applicants was disproportionate to the
number of points awarded to students who contributed to the diversity of the school
based on other characteristics, like leadership and community service).
40. See Mark W. Cordes, Symposium, Affirmative Action After Grutter and Gratz, 24
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 691, 693, 729-39 (2004) (arguing that the Grutter and Gratz opinions
prohibited the use of rigid admissions systems that award each racial minority a
predetermined number of points based on race).
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race as a factor, race cannot be the decisive factor in the admissions
41
decision.
2. The Equal Protection Clause and the Court’s gender jurisprudence
The Equal Protection Clause also prohibits gender discrimination,
although the Supreme Court analyzes gender-based policies under
42
intermediate scrutiny. While the Court has not yet addressed the
issue of gender-based affirmative action policies that benefit male
43
applicants, the Court’s opinions in United States v. Virginia (“VMI”)
44
and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan provide a framework to
45
analyze colleges’ use of gender in admissions decisions.
These
opinions emphasize the need to conduct a searching judicial inquiry
of the school’s asserted goal to ensure that the rationale does not rely
46
on stereotypes about the capabilities of males and females.
A gender-based affirmative action policy would likely be evaluated
under a lesser standard of scrutiny than race-based affirmative action
because a majority of the Court has never identified gender as a
47
suspect classification.
As mentioned above, the Court analyzes
gender classifications under intermediate scrutiny, which requires
that the policy be substantially related to an important government
48
interest. In VMI, the Court held that the government must have an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for a policy that distinguishes
49
among individuals based solely on their gender.
Some
commentators have argued that this standard of review is more
demanding than traditional intermediate scrutiny, but this issue
remains an open question until the Court next decides another

41. See id. at 724-25 (noting that each student’s application must be read as a
whole, and although race can be weighed more heavily than other factors, it must be
evaluated in light of the applicant’s overall qualifications).
42. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (holding that gender
discrimination is unconstitutional unless the gender classifications are substantially
related to an important governmental objective, and that administrative convenience
is not an important governmental objective for gender-based classifications).
43. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
44. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
45. See Jaschik, supra note 19 (stating that although the Supreme Court has not
addressed the constitutionality of an affirmative action policy that benefits male
students, in VMI, the Court held that VMI needed an exceedingly persuasive
justification to deny admission to female students based solely on their gender).
46. See infra note 136 (noting that it is not enough to simply rely on proffered
benign justifications).
47. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (recognizing that only a
plurality of the court identified sex as a suspect classification).
48. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
49. 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).

FRANZESE.OFFTOPRINTER

2007]

1/30/2007 12:46:14 PM

THE GENDER CURVE

727

50

gender discrimination case. Based on the Court’s recent gender
discrimination jurisprudence, colleges would need to have an
exceedingly persuasive justification to implement an affirmative
action program that benefited male students and prove that the plan
51
was substantially related to its asserted goal.
In VMI, the Court held that Virginia Military Institute’s policy that
denied admission to female students violated the Equal Protection
52
Clause. VMI asserted that the institution contributed to educational
diversity by offering students the option to attend a single-sex
53
university. The Court, however, rejected VMI’s justification because
at the time of the university’s inception, single-sex education for male
students was the primary model of higher education in the United
54
States. In addition, the Court held that VMI’s assertion that the
admission of women would destroy its reliance on its adversative
teaching method did not constitute an exceedingly persuasive
justification because the school’s rationale for retaining the male-only
admissions policy was based upon stereotypes about women’s
55
abilities.
The Court’s holding in VMI reaffirmed its decision in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan that individuals cannot be excluded
56
from educational institutions based solely on their gender.
In
Hogan, the Court held that the Mississippi University for Women’s
policy of excluding male students from its nursing school violated the
50. See Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. .J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 35, 39-40 (1997) (arguing that the Court’s opinion in VMI moved the
standard of review for gender classifications closer to strict scrutiny).
51. See Jaschik, supra note 19 (explaining that it is unlikely that Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, the author of VMI, would consider the inability to find a dance
partner, one of the justifications for a gender affirmative action policy, an
exceedingly persuasive justification).
52. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 519, 545-46 (holding that VMI’s admissions policy, which
limited its enrollment to male students, violated the Equal Protection Clause because
it relied on stereotypes about the capabilities of male and female applicants).
53. See id. at 524 (explaining that the district court agreed with VMI that the
university fostered the state’s goal of educational diversity by offering a single-sex
option where a majority of the public universities were co-educational).
54. See id. at 537 (arguing that at VMI’s inception equal educational
opportunities were not available to men and women since scholars considered
higher education to be dangerous for women).
55. See id. at 540 (rejecting VMI’s assertion that changes to accommodate women
would be so radical that the school’s use of the adversative method would be
destroyed because the school based its conclusion on stereotypes about the
capabilities of the average woman rather than the individual capacities of a particular
female applicant). The adversative model of education is one that “features
‘[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy,
minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.’” Id. at 522
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421-22 (W.D.Va. 1991)).
56. See id. at 519 (holding that VMI cannot exclude qualified female applicants
based on sex alone).
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57

Equal Protection Clause.
The Court rejected the university’s
asserted goal of affirmative action for women because nursing is an
58
The university’s
occupation traditionally dominated by females.
policy also failed the second prong of the inquiry; it did not
substantially relate to the preservation of the school’s educational
mission because the school failed to provide evidence that male
students’ presence in the classroom would adversely affect female
59
students’ performance.
B. Affirmative Action Policies under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972
In addition to the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 provides a statutory framework for
female students to challenge affirmative action policies that benefit
male applicants. Title IX claims are often brought in conjunction
with Equal Protection claims and could potentially provide a higher
60
level of scrutiny. This Section includes an overview of Title IX’s
statutory language and describes case law construing this statute.
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in all educational institutions
61
that receive federal funding. Although Title IX contains absolute
language about the prohibition on sex discrimination in all
educational institutions, there are eight exceptions to this broad
62
coverage.
One of these exceptions relates to discriminatory
admissions policies and limits the statute’s coverage, at the
63
undergraduate level, to public coeducational institutions.
57. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982).
58. See id. at 729 n.14 (explaining that “[i]n 1980, women received more than 94
percent of the baccalaureate [nursing] degrees conferred nationwide . . . and
constituted 96.5 percent of the registered nurses in the labor force”).
59. See id. at 731 (“The uncontroverted record reveals that admitting men to
nursing classes does not affect teaching style . . . [and] that the presence of men in
the classroom would not affect the performance of the female nursing
students . . . .”); see also id. at 730 (explaining that the school’s assertion that males’
presence in the classroom would adversely affect women is undermined by the fact
that it allows male students to audit nursing classes).
60. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (noting that several federal
courts have applied strict scrutiny to evaluate gender discrimination claims brought
under Title IX).
61. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)
(“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; see Allison Herren Lee, Title IX, Equal Protection, and the
Richter Scale: Will VMI’s Vibrations Topple Single-Sex Education, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 37,
56 (1997) (describing the eight exceptions to Title IX’s broad prohibition against
gender discrimination).
63. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (“[I]n regard to admissions to educational
institutions, this section shall apply only to institutions of vocational education,
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Consequently, Title IX, which usually provides greater protection
64
than the Equal Protection Clause, provides a limited remedy in the
context of discriminatory admissions policies.
Some federal courts have granted female students greater
protection under Title IX by applying strict scrutiny to evaluate
65
schools’ discriminatory policies. These courts have interpreted Title
IX to provide greater protection than the Equal Protection Clause by
analogizing it to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits the
use of race discrimination by any program that receives monetary
66
assistance from the federal government. Since Title IX and Title VI
have nearly identical wording except for the designation of the
67
protected class, many courts look to legal opinions analyzing Title
68
VI when interpreting Title IX. These courts have concluded that
Title IX’s legislative history supports the proposition that Congress
assumed the statutory interpretation of Title IX would follow Title
69
70
VI. For example, in Jeldness v. Pearce, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that since the statutes contained

professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of
undergraduate higher education.”).
64. See David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
217, 271 (2005) (“Textually, doctrinally, and theoretically, Title IX paints a more
complete version of equality than the Equal Protection Clause.”).
65. See Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 609, 614 (8th Cir. 1997); Jeldness v.
Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1994); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 648 F.2d 1104,
1106 (7th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F.
Supp. 2d 1362, 1367 (S.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). See
generally Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 695-96 (1979) (concluding that
Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI and assumed that Title IX would be
interpreted by analogy to Title VI).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
67. Compare Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”), with 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”).
68. See Cohen, supra note 64, at 222 (“[T]he most common way courts and
commentators compare Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause is indirectly, by
comparing Title IX to Title VI.”); 117 CONG. REC. 28453, 30407 (1971) (explaining
during congressional debate that some of Title IX’s language was taken directly from
Title VI).
69. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.16 (stating that the congressional debate
concluded that the passage of Title IX only added the word “sex” to a current law
[Title VI]); 118 CONG. REC. 5111, 5803 (1972) (explaining that “[e]nforcement
powers include fund termination provisions—and appropriate safeguards—parallel
to those found in Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act”).
70. 30 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1994).
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nearly identical language, the same level of protection should be
71
accorded to both protected classes—race and gender.
Recently, in Johnson v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia
72
(“Johnson I”) the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia used strict scrutiny to evaluate a gender
discrimination claim challenging the University of Georgia’s (“UGA”)
73
affirmative action policy. UGA awarded an additional quarter point
to all male students’ academic indices and a half point to all minority
74
The court held that this affirmative
students’ academic indices.
75
action policy that favored males violated Title IX. This decision,
which predates Grutter and Gratz, declined to recognize diversity in
education as a compelling state interest because the university failed
to provide quantitative or qualitative evidence to support its
76
program. The district court did not address whether the plan was
narrowly tailored because the court concluded that the goal of
diversity was “so inherently formless and malleable that no plan can
77
be narrowly tailored to fit it.”
Since UGA’s affirmative action plan provided a bonus to minority
and male applicants, the district court’s opinion addressed both
78
issues. The district court used strict scrutiny to evaluate both the
79
The court found that UGA’s
racial and gender preferences.
admissions director could not articulate any need for gender diversity
other than a basic assertion that “the state of Georgia is 49th in the
71. Compare Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1227-28 (noting that in the absence of contrary
authority gender discrimination challenged under Title IX should be evaluated
under strict scrutiny, like race discrimination), with Cohen, supra note 64, at 244
(“The meaning and applicability of Title VI are useful guides in construing Title
IX . . . only to the extent that the language and history of Title IX do not suggest a
contrary interpretation. . . . For although two statutes may be similar in language
and objective, we must not fail to give effect to the differences between them.”).
72. 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir.
2001).
73. See id. at 1365 (explaining that a female student challenged the school’s
affirmative action policy that awarded a preference based on an applicant’s gender
and race).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 1372 (finding that UGA relied on stereotypes and generalized
statements to justify its assertion that diversity in education constituted a compelling
interest, rather than providing concrete, quantifiable evidence).
77. Id. at 1374. The court’s conclusion was grounded in the reasoning that “[t]o
base racial preferences upon an amorphous, unquantifiable, and temporally
unlimited goal is to engage in naked racial balancing . . . .” Id. at 1373.
78. See id. at 1375 (evaluating the gender affirmative action plan using the same
analysis as racial affirmative action plans because the school did not proffer a
different rationale for that plan).
79. See id. at 1367 (explaining that since Title IX and Title VI use the same
statutory language, “the standard for finding gender discrimination under Title IX is
the same as Title VI’s standard for racial discrimination . . . i.e., strict scrutiny”).
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country in the percentage of baccalaureate degrees going to males.”
The district court further explained that “gender preferencing would
not even survive the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny
[because] . . . [t]he desire to ‘help out’ men who are not earning
baccalaureate degrees in the same numbers as women . . . is far from
81
persuasive.” Since the parties did not raise the gender issue on
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
82
focused on the constitutionality of the race-based preference,
whereas the district court’s opinion provides a preliminary analysis of
the danger of using affirmative action policies to benefit male
83
students.
The Eleventh Circuit declined to address the issue of
whether diversity constituted a compelling interest and instead
84
evaluated whether the plan was narrowly tailored.
The circuit court implemented a four-factor test to evaluate
85
whether the plan satisfied the narrowly tailored requirement. The
opinion emphasized the importance of flexibility in the admissions
program and explained that the goal of diversity should not
constitute an end in itself, but rather a means for achieving the broad
86
mix of cultures and ideas represented in society.
The Eleventh
Circuit held that the policy was not narrowly tailored since it
provided a rigid set of points to minority applicants without an
individual determination of their contribution to the school’s goal of
87
diversity.
80. See id. at 1375 (concluding that “UGA’s asserted need for ‘gender diversity,’
then, obviously is a front for its gender-balancing desire”); see also id. (quoting UGA’s
admissions director who asserted that there is a problem “[b]ecause our men are not
completing college degrees at the same rate as our females are”).
81. Id. at 1376 n.10.
82. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson II), 263 F.3d 1234, 1242
n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that the defendants did not appeal the district court’s
holding that the gender discrimination violated Title IX).
83. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (concluding that “UGA’s gender bonus
points, despite being cloaked in the language of ‘diversity-fostering,’ represent
nothing more than inartfully veiled gender balancing”).
84. See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1244 (refusing to consider “whether or when
student body diversity may be a compelling interest” because the university “plainly
failed to show its policy is narrowly tailored to serve that interest”).
85. See id. at 1253 (concluding that the four factors should be: “(1) whether the
policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way . . . (2) whether the policy fully and
fairly takes account of race-neutral factors . . . (3) whether the policy gives an
arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial groups; and
(4) whether the school has genuinely considered . . . race-neutral alternatives . . . .”).
86. See id. (explaining that a white applicant could, in some circumstances,
provide a greater contribution to diversity than a non-white applicant based on his or
her background).
87. See id. at 1254 (determining that the plan mechanically distributed a predetermined number of points to each minority applicant, which allowed minority
students to be admitted at the expense of other students who could contribute more
in terms of diversity).
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C. Affirmative Action Policies and State Equality Statutes
The Equal Protection Clause and Title IX provide limited remedies
to female students because they are only applicable to public
88
undergraduate institutions.
However, in several states these
students could also challenge private colleges’ affirmative action
policies under state educational equity statutes.
This Section
provides an overview of the relevant state statutes and distinguishes
them from the federal remedies.
Many states have enacted comprehensive educational equity
statutes or human rights acts that prohibit sex discrimination in
89
educational institutions.
While some of these statutes track the
language of Title IX and apply admissions gender equality
requirements only to public institutions, several states have statutes
that prohibit such discrimination in both private and public
90
undergraduate institutions.
When interpreting human rights acts and educational equity
statutes, state and federal courts find analysis of analogous federal
91
statutes instructive. However, courts have consistently emphasized
that while analysis of federal law may be applied in appropriate
92
circumstances, it does not constitute binding precedent. Therefore,
courts can use the broad educational equity statutes to provide
greater protection for individuals by allowing remedies against
private colleges.
The Minnesota Human Rights Act is one statute where the
language differs from Title IX and could allow discriminatory
93
admissions policies to be challenged at private colleges. The Act
provides: “It is an unfair discriminatory practice to discriminate in
88. See supra note 21 (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment has a state
action requirement); see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (describing
Title IX’s admissions exception that excludes private undergraduate universities).
89. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6625 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-7-403
(2005); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4602(1) (2001);
MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.03, 363A.13, 363A.23 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-22 (2002).
90. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.13 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 (2006); 24
PA. STAT. ANN. § 5004 (West 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-22 (2002).
91. See Jacobsen v. Tillman, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (D. Minn. 1998)
(construing the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) using the same analysis as
federal law claims); Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn.
1999) (holding that Title VII case law applies when courts construe the MHRA).
92. See Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
that courts apply the plain language meaning of the state statute where the language
differs from developments in federal case law); Fahey v. Avnet, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 568,
572 (Minn. 1994) (asserting that principles of Title VII law are merely instructive
precedent for courts evaluating the MHRA).
93. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.13 (2001) (prohibiting educational institutions from
excluding students based on gender).
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any manner in the full utilization of or benefit from any educational
institution, or the services rendered thereby to any person because
94
The statute further explicitly prohibits sex
of . . . sex . . . .”
95
discrimination in educational institutions’ admissions’ policies. The
MHRA defines the term “educational institution” to include colleges
96
generally, and the statute contains no exception limiting its
97
coverage to state universities.
For example, in Montgomery v. Independent School District No. 709,
when a student alleged, under this Act, that he was a victim of samesex sexual harassment at school, the district court looked to the
98
statutory language of the Act to evaluate the claim.
The court
construed the term “sexual harassment” to allow claims by students
for same-sex harassment since the statutory language did not contain
a requirement that the harassment be motivated by “sexual interest,”
but rather that the harassment be “verbal or physical conduct of a
99
sexual nature.” The court reached this decision even though the
issue of whether same-sex harassment is actionable under Title IX
100
had not been conclusively decided.
In addition to the educational equity statutes, students could also
challenge these affirmative action policies under state equal rights
amendments. Although the Federal Equal Rights Amendment has
101
not been enacted,
twenty-two states have state equal rights
amendments that guarantee equal rights for female citizens of their
102
respective states. These amendments provide greater protection for
94. MINN. STAT. § 363A.13(1) (2001).
95. MINN. STAT. § 363A.13(2) (2001) (“It is an unfair discriminatory practice to
exclude . . . a person seeking admission as a student . . . because of . . . sex . . .”).
96. For purposes of the MHRA, educational institution is defined as “a public or
private institution and includes an academy, college, elementary or secondary
school, extension course, kindergarten, nursery, school system and a business,
nursing, professional, secretarial, technical, vocational school; and includes an agent
of an educational institution.” MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(14).
97. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.23(1) (stating that while there is no general exception
for private colleges, there is an admissions exception for private colleges that have
been traditionally single-sex institutions).
98. See Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087-88,
1090 n.9 (D. Minn. 2000) (looking to the plain statutory language to determine the
definition of sexual harassment rather than relying on federal courts’ Title IX
analysis).
99. Id. at 1087-88.
100. See id. at 1089-90 (holding that the language of the MHRA controls where
there are differences between the statutory language of the MHRA and Title IX).
101. See Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating their
Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201,
1202 n.7 (2005) (explaining that although Congress passed the Federal Equal Rights
Amendment (“ERA”) in 1972, the necessary three-fourths of the states failed to ratify
it).
102. Id. at 1202.
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female students than the Equal Protection Clause because often these
amendments do not have a state action requirement and therefore
103
The state equal
their reach can be extended to private actors.
rights amendments also raise the level of scrutiny beyond
104
intermediate to strict scrutiny, requiring a party to assert that its
plan is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest.
While litigants often focus on federal remedies, state statutes and
105
constitutions often offer broader protection of civil rights.
In the
context of affirmative action policies that benefit male students, the
objectives of the state and federal statutes are the same—the
106
eradication of gender discrimination.
However, often the state
statutes are broadly worded and can therefore encompass a greater
107
variety of discriminatory acts than the federal statutes.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Affirmative Action Policies that Benefit Male Students Require a Different
Framework of Analysis than Racial Affirmative Action Policies
This Section will delineate the differences between racial
affirmative action policies and affirmative action policies that benefit
male students to demonstrate why the racial affirmative action cases
do not adequately resolve the issue of the constitutionality of genderbased affirmative action policies. Various characteristics distinguish
male affirmative action programs from racial affirmative action
policies. The racial affirmative action cases are based on the premise
of historical discrimination against minorities and their subsequent
underrepresentation in colleges and universities, yet these issues are

103. See id. at 1229-30 (discussing how some states’ ERAs, like those of Montana
and Rhode Island, expressly extend the prohibitions to private actors while other
states, like Maryland and Pennsylvania, have broader language that could be
interpreted to include private individuals).
104. See id. at 1240 (concluding that most state courts used their state ERAs to
provide greater protection against gender discrimination by forcing states to meet
the strict scrutiny standard rather than the intermediate scrutiny standard that
federal courts use to evaluate claims of gender discrimination).
105. See id. at 1203 (explaining that “many state courts are interpreting state
constitutions as independent, and often broader, sources of protection for individual
liberties”).
106. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.02(a)(5) (2001) (“It is the public policy of this
state to secure for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination: . . . in
education because of . . . sex . . . .”).
107. See infra Part II.3 (describing that the broad language of the MHRA could
allow students to challenge colleges’ targeted recruitment campaigns for male
students).
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108

not applicable to male students.
Additionally, racial affirmative
action policies were designed to assist a disadvantaged class of
applicants and disavowed the use of stereotypes about the abilities of
109
minority applicants.
However, colleges’ enactments of targeted
recruitment policies to attract male candidates rely on impermissible
stereotypes regarding the traditional gender roles of males and
110
females.
The Court’s analyses of racial affirmative action policies have been
based on the premise that African Americans historically lacked
opportunities to attend institutions of higher education in the United
111
States.
Males as a group have never been the victims of
112
discrimination in institutions of higher education. To the contrary,
many universities in the United States limited their enrollment to
113
male students until the early 1970s.
While the Grutter and Gratz opinions demonstrate a movement in
affirmative action jurisprudence from a goal of diversity-as-difference
114
toward a goal of diversity-as-integration, the need for an affirmative
108. See, e.g., WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, 3 (Ana M. Martínez
Alemán & Kristen A. Renn eds., 2002) (stating that Harvard College, the first
American college, was founded in 1663 to “train young men for the ministry and for
future leadership positions within colonial government”); Jaschik, supra note 19
(explaining that the purpose of affirmative action policies is to remedy past
discrimination, and males did not suffer from historical discrimination); Lewin, supra
note 9 (finding that in the highest income groups men of all races were more likely
than women to attend college and that the largest gender gap was among nontraditional college students, where women outnumbered men two to one).
109. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319-20 (2003) (noting the testimony of
educational experts who explained that the enrollment of a “critical mass” of
minority students is designed to eliminate racial stereotypes).
110. See infra notes 150-151 and accompanying text (describing colleges’ targeted
recruitment efforts to increase male enrollment, including improving science and
math programs since males traditionally dominate these majors); see also Bill
Pennington, Small Colleges, Short of Men, Embrace Football, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at
A1 (explaining that the addition of a football team would increase male enrollment,
not only because of the addition of the male players, but because more male than
female students consider the addition attractive).
111. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (“The State
certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating
where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination.”).
112. See WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 108, at 3-4 (describing that
institutions of higher education were created for men and limited their enrollment
to male students for decades).
113. See id. at 4 (noting that only a few institutions taught women before the Civil
War, and the first college to offer co-education was Oberlin College in 1837, almost
200 years after the founding of Harvard College); see also Kingsbury, supra note 15
(explaining that Boston College, Johns Hopkins University, Brown, the University of
Notre Dame, Dartmouth College, and Harvard did not become co-educational
universities until the 1970s).
114. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work:
A Title VII Critique of
Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1414-16 (2006) (explaining that
the goal of diversity-as-integration contemplates a forward looking focus to end racial
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action plan to achieve diversity correlates to the historic
115
discrimination against racial minorities. The diversity-as-integration
concept seeks to reduce racial segregation in the workplace and
116
society. Court opinions suggest that creating an environment that
allows students to interact with diverse individuals fosters tolerance
117
and a sense of community that extends to the workplace. However,
colleges cannot support male affirmative action policies based on this
theory since although women currently constitute a majority of
college students, they continue to lag behind men in earning
118
capacity, and males occupy the majority of the leadership positions
119
On average, women
in corporations, large law firms, and politics.
earn only seventy-seven cents for every dollar earned by their male
counterparts, and only six females hold the CEO positions at Fortune
120
500 companies. Additionally, while females comprise nearly half of
the population at the nation’s law schools, only 17.3% of the partners
121
at large law firms are female.
Therefore, a remedial rationale for
an affirmative action policy benefiting male students would not
122
constitute an exceedingly persuasive justification.

segregation by using universities to breed tolerance and acceptance of individuals
from different cultural and racial backgrounds).
115. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding racial
segregation in places of public accommodation).
116. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 113, at 1415 (arguing that “diverse universities
are instrumental to realizing extrinsic social goals” and that “[i]ntegration signals
that institutions and paths to leadership are open to members of all races”).
117. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (indicating that integration
facilitates success in increasingly diverse workplace environments).
118. Marklein, supra note 6, at 1A; see also Ben Feller, Women Are Passing or Catching
Men in College Areas Once Dominated by Men, MSN ENCARTA, http://encarta.msn.com/
encnet/departments/adultlearning/?article=womenpassingmen (last visited Sept. 7,
2006) (explaining that even though women receive most of the diplomas conferred
in fields like business and biology, women are still paid less than their male
counterparts).
119. See, e.g., CRS Report for Congress, Membership of the 109th Congress 1, June
13, 2006, available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22007.pdf
(revealing that only eighty-four of the five hundred thirty- five members of Congress
are female); Del Jones, Few Women Hold Top Executive Jobs, Even When CEOs are Females,
USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2003, at 1B (indicating that there are only six female CEOs at
Fortune 500 companies).
120. Jake Ellison, Gender Gap Puzzles Colleges, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REP.,
Dec. 23, 2002, at A1 (reporting that “women make up only 15.7 percent of the
corporate officers in the United States’ 500 largest companies” and that women
constitute only twenty-one percent of presidents at four-year colleges and
universities).
121. Timothy L. O’Brien, Up the Down Staircase, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at C1
(describing that while women and men graduate from law school in equal numbers,
women disappear at the highest tier of most large law firms).
122. Cf. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (rejecting
Mississippi University for Women’s asserted remedial goal of compensating women
for historical discrimination since nursing is predominantly a female occupation).
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Additionally, male students represent a substantial proportion of
the student population on college campuses. Colleges assert the
need for racial diversity based on the premise that students from
diverse backgrounds bring different viewpoints to class discussions
123
and the overall college environment.
The diversity-as-integration
doctrine envisions a sufficiently large number of minority students, so
124
that students do not feel like representatives of their race.
However, while females constitute the majority of undergraduate
students, it is unlikely that male students feel the need to act as
spokesmen for their gender when nationwide they constitute forty125
three percent of college students. Contrastingly, African American
and Hispanic students represent only thirteen percent and eleven
126
percent of the college population, respectively.
While the Grutter opinion embraced diversity-as-integration, the
narrowly tailored plan for implementation focuses on an
individualized determination of each applicant’s qualifications, thus
127
presenting an internal contradiction.
The contradiction exists
because for society to realize the benefits of diversity-as-integration
there must be a significant number of racially diverse individuals on
college campuses, yet a narrowly tailored program prohibits schools
128
from focusing on numbers.
One commentator argues, “[e]ven as
Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion resists defining race in terms of a
‘specific and identifiable’ contribution to diversity, it demands an
129
inquiry linked to a static view of racial identity.”
If courts applied
the same analysis to evaluate a gender-based affirmative action
program, a narrowly tailored plan would similarly assume that male
and female students act in accordance with their socially constructed
123. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003) (explaining that the
University of Michigan Law School enacted a racial affirmative action policy to
“achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and
thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts”).
124. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 114, at 1433-34 (explaining that the concept of
diversity-as-integration requires universities to consider the total percentage of
minority students on the campus because a higher percentage of minority students
reduces discrimination).
125. THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION, supra note 7, at 36, 125.
126. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.: Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Fast Facts, Sept. 1, 2005,
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=98.
127. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 114, at 1417-18 (explaining that individualized
consideration of applicants’ contributions to diversity in Grutter illustrates the
diversity-as-difference rationale because that rationale justifies the admission of
students of different races based on the proposition that their race led to different
experiences).
128. See id. at 1419 (arguing that to achieve the meaningful minority
representation on campus that will further the goal of diversity-as-integration,
schools need to focus on numbers).
129. Id. at 1418.
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130

gender roles.
The concept of diversity-as-difference inherent in
gender affirmative action policies provides problems for the
eradication of stereotypes about the roles of men and women, while
the diversity-as-integration theme does not apply to males since they
131
occupy society’s leadership roles.
Therefore, affirmative action
programs that benefit male students must be analyzed differently
than race-based classifications.
B. Proposed Framework to Evaluate Affirmative Action Programs that Benefit
Male Students
This Section delineates and applies a proposed framework to
review the constitutionality of gender-based affirmative action policies
benefiting male students and concludes that such policies would fail
intermediate scrutiny. Then, this Section highlights the importance
of state statutes prohibiting discrimination in educational institutions.
The proposed framework to evaluate affirmative action plans that
benefit male students must scrutinize whether such a plan constitutes
an important government interest since males do not belong to a
historically disadvantaged class. The proposed framework evaluates
affirmative action policies that benefit male students based on two
132
main criteria: (1) whether the plan relies on gender stereotypes
and (2) whether the purpose of the plan is truly gender diversity
133
rather than a mere attempt at gender balancing. These criteria are
based on the elements necessary to satisfy the requirements of
intermediate scrutiny, which the court developed in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan and VMI. These elements are central to
the analysis since a rationale supporting the necessity of a male
affirmative action policy cannot rely on assumptions about the

130. See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996) (rejecting the
use of stereotypes about the experiences of males and females based on sociallyconstructed gender roles); cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 114, at 1418 (describing how
the narrowly tailored requirement assumes that racial minorities have different
experiences because they are racial minorities).
131. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (describing males’ dominant
role in business, law, and politics).
132. Cf. VMI, 518 U.S. at 540-41 (holding that although VMI may not have been
the ideal school for all females, female students who sought such an adversative
environment should have had the opportunity to attend the institution); Miss. Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (“Care must be taken in ascertaining
whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.”).
133. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d
1362, 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (refusing to defer to the school’s mere assertion of the
need for diversity on campus where the administrators stated that they wanted to
enroll an equal proportion of male and female students), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th
Cir. 2001).
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capabilities of males and females, and a plan that merely seeks to
achieve an equal proportion of male and female students is not
135
substantially related to the achievement of diversity. To determine
whether the plan satisfies these criteria, it is necessary to conduct a
searching inquiry of the asserted justification of the need for such a
policy, rather than rely on the “mere recitation of a
136
benign . . . purpose.”
1. Affirmative action policies implemented to benefit males do not constitute
an important government interest
Because of the differences between race-based affirmative action
policies and affirmative action policies benefiting male students,
courts must require colleges to provide substantive evidence that the
college’s interest in gender diversity constitutes an exceedingly
137
As in VMI and Hogan, the college must
persuasive justification.
support the asserted justification with evidence that is based on
138
legitimate educational objectives.
This evidence cannot rely on
stereotypes or assumptions about the capabilities of male or female
139
Additionally, “[a] policy of
students or their likely interests.
diversity which aims to provide an array of educational
140
opportunities . . . must do more than favor one gender.”
To sustain a male affirmative action policy, the college would need
to provide evidence regarding the need for a greater percentage of
male students on campus based on a lack of diversity. In Johnson I,
the University of Georgia was unable to articulate a legitimate

134. See infra notes 165, 177, 179 and accompanying text (concluding that the
Supreme Court prohibits reliance on stereotypes regarding the relative abilities of
males and females).
135. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining that a college’s attempt
at gender balancing does not evidence a plan substantially related to achieving a
diverse college class).
136. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728; see VMI, 518 U.S. at 535-36 (“In cases of this genre,
our precedent instructs that ‘benign’ justifications proffered in defense of
categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification must
describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently
grounded.”).
137. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (explaining that the
university’s inability to explain how racial diversity advances the school’s educational
objectives “bespeaks the inherently amorphous nature of this concept”).
138. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 535 (maintaining that Virginia did not show that VMI
meant to diversify educational opportunities); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730 (concluding
that the state “failed to establish that the alleged objective is the actual purpose
underlying the discriminatory classification”).
139. See infra note 148 (rejecting the use of stereotypes as a justification for
distinctions based on gender).
140. Id. at 525.
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rationale for the need to have gender diversity on campus.
Administrators at other colleges around the nation have proffered
justifications such as social concerns about girls’ ability to find
suitable marriage partners with a comparable educational level and
142
unequal proportions of male and female students at dances.
One
administrator used circular reasoning to support a program that
favored males in the admissions process by noting that since “men
were so highly prized . . . some of them bec[a]me sexual predators,”
implying that the school needed to increase the number of males on
143
campus to make it safer for women.
While the University of Georgia asserted diversity as its goal once
litigation began, none of the administrators articulated any academic
144
need to have more males in the student body. The administrators
did not suggest that greater gender diversity would present more
lively class discussions or that a diverse college environment would
145
help students prepare for the workforce and reduce prejudice.
Since the administrators did not articulate a genuine need for
diversity, it seems that this justification was merely a pretext for the
146
policy unsupported by any substantive data.
Therefore, these
141. Cf. Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (acknowledging
Director McDuff’s affirmative response in his deposition when questioned as to
whether the school hoped the affirmative action policy would “produce a crafted
class that is more proportionate in terms of male and female representation”), aff’d,
263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
142. See Vickers, supra note 4 (relaying that administrators find a 50/50 split
desirable in terms of social atmosphere). But cf. Lewin, supra note 10 (explaining
that colleges desire gender proportionality not only for social reasons but to attract a
diverse mix of students to the campus); Vickers, supra note 4 (“The consequences go
far beyond a lousy social life and the longer-term reality that many women won’t find
educated male peers to marry. There are also academic consequences, and
economic ones.”).
143. Lewin, supra note 10.
144. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (describing the testimony of the
admissions director who was unable to articulate an academic need for a diverse class
and explained that the discussion centered on enrolling a more proportionate
number of male students); cf. Jaschik, supra note 19 (Jocelyn Samuels of the National
Women’s Law Center explained that administrators did not provide educational
justifications for the affirmative action programs but rather focused on social
concerns based on stereotypes of the kind that Title IX sought to eliminate).
145. See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (revealing that UGA’s administrators
only expressed concerns about enrolling a class that contained an equal proportion
of male and female students); cf. id. at 1372 (explaining that the university
administrators merely relied on a “truism that relationships between people of
different backgrounds are based on something other than a shared background” and
that “people from racially homogenous environments cannot ‘fully work
cooperatively’ with individuals of a different race when they finally encounter
them”).
146. Cf. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 535-36 (1996) (asserting
that colleges cannot advance benign rationales during the course of litigation that
are unsupported by substantive evidence).
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rationales do not assert a legitimate pedagogical goal for the need of
gender diversity on campus.
For diversity to constitute an exceedingly persuasive justification, it
must be based on more than stereotypes and generalizations about
147
the roles of men and women. Concerns about women’s inability to
find a similarly educated husband or partner at a dance are the very
types of traditional gender stereotypes that have trapped women for
148
generations.
In addition to relying primarily on social and safety concerns,
which stereotype women as the weaker sex, therefore needing
149
protection, other schools concerned about gender imbalances on
their campuses engaged in targeted recruitment campaigns based on
150
stereotypical ideas regarding gender roles. These schools improved
their engineering curriculum, highlighted math and science
programs in admissions brochures, added more pictures of male
151
students to school publications, and added football teams.
Like
VMI, which believed that its adversative method was inappropriate for
female students, these schools used stereotypes to generalize about
the programs and majors that would attract more males to their
152
college campuses.
However, Supreme Court jurisprudence dating
back to the 1970s has rejected the idea of gender stereotypes, and
programs that use such generalizations to increase diversity on

147. See id. at 533 (holding that the justification advanced by the university cannot
“rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females”).
148. Cf. id. at 542-44 (labeling the gender stereotypes preventing women from
entering VMI as “self-fulfilling prophecies” and likening them to the stereotypes that
once prevented women access to legal and medical educations).
149. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (relaying that such
notions of romantic paternalism “in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage”).
150. See Fonda, supra note 3 (detailing a recruiting technique at the University of
North Carolina that touts the school’s math and science programs to increase male
enrollment since these majors traditionally appeal to male students); Karnasiewicz,
supra note 5 (describing how some institutions use admission-oriented blogs to
attract more male students, based on the stereotype that male students are more
technology-savvy than female students).
151. See Karnasiewicz, supra note 5 (explaining the pointed recruitment
campaigns that schools use to attract more male students, including “masculine”
colors in admissions brochures and “pictures of smiling, confident young men”);
Pennington, supra note 110 (describing how some small colleges are attracting male
students by adding football teams). The president of Shenandoah University
explained that “[f]ootball is the best draw of qualified male applicants that there is
anywhere.” Id.
152. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 524 (describing VMI’s insistence that its distinctive,
adversative method would need to undergo such radical alterations to accommodate
women that it would be destroyed).
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campus cannot meet the exceedingly persuasive justification
153
standard.
The objective of assisting a disproportionately burdened class
would also fail under this framework because males have not been
154
subject to discrimination in education.
In Hogan, the university
155
However,
stated that its goal was affirmative action for women.
since nursing was a traditionally female occupation, the Court
concluded that this justification could not support the school’s policy
156
of denying admission to men. A similar argument was advanced in
VMI, where the school asserted that single sex education for males
157
created diverse educational opportunities for students.
However,
the Court rejected this justification because single-sex education
institutions for men existed since the dawn of higher education in
158
the United States and men had ample educational opportunities.
Colleges cannot merely rely on the fact that men constitute fortythree percent of the student population on college campuses as a
justification for these affirmative action policies. Rather than
increase diversity and tolerance in society, policies that promote the
advancement of men to the detriment of women reinforce
159
stereotypes about gender roles in society.
2. Colleges’ affirmative action policies that benefit male students are not
substantially related to the goal of achieving diversity
For a college’s affirmative action policy to be substantially related
to achieving the asserted goal of diversity, the school must implement
a plan truly designed to increase the diversity of the class rather than

153. Cf. id. at 532 (“[N]either federal nor state government acts compatibly with
the equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply
because they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and
capacities.”).
154. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (contending
that white males are not a “discrete and insular minority”).
155. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727 (1982) (iterating the
State’s argument that the exclusion of men constituted affirmative action for women,
compensating for discrimination against females).
156. See supra note 60 (describing the demographics of the nursing labor force).
157. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 535 (acknowledging Virginia’s claim that single-sex
education affords diversity, a pedagogical benefit, to some students).
158. See id. at 536 (“Neither recent nor distant history bears out Virginia’s alleged
pursuit of diversity through single-sex educational options. In 1839, when the
Commonwealth established VMI, a range of educational opportunities for men and
women was scarcely contemplated.”).
159. Cf. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729 (“MUW’s policy of excluding males from
admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of
nursing as an exclusively woman’s job.”).
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simply enroll an equal proportion of male and female students. To
determine whether this relationship exists, courts should evaluate the
flexibility of the program, its consideration of gender-neutral factors,
the disproportionate benefits to the favored class, and the existence
161
of gender-neutral alternatives.
These factors comport with this Comment’s proposed genderequality framework because they ensure that colleges can articulate
support for the asserted justification of diversity by relying on
substantive pedagogical objectives rather than assumptions about the
162
inherent capabilities of males and females. The Supreme Court has
consistently rejected the argument that colleges and universities can
simply assert their justification for a policy that distinguishes between
163
individuals based on gender without subsequent judicial scrutiny.
Colleges need to provide substantive evidence that the plan includes
an individual evaluation of all applicants and considers the diverse
contributions that the student brings to the campus, other than his
164
gender.
a. Rigid point systems do not constitute flexible affirmative action policies
Systems that award points based on an applicant’s gender
constitute rigid and mechanized determinations that do not fully
evaluate the applicant’s talents and abilities to enrich the student
165
experience on campus.
A court would likely find an attempt to
equalize the number of male and female students on campus for the
sake of proportionality unconstitutional because of its similarity to a
160. Cf. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d
1362, 1375-76 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (rejecting a school’s admissions plan because the
school’s asserted goal of diversity was more likely an attempt at gender balancing),
aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
161. Cf. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson II), 263 F.3d 1234, 1253
(11th Cir. 2001) (explaining four factors that should be used to evaluate whether an
affirmative action plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted objective).
162. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 550 (mandating that colleges cannot rely on
generalizations about the supposed tendencies of the female gender and cannot
deny opportunities to women “whose talent and capacity place them outside the
average description”).
163. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 (concluding that the school’s mere articulation of
a benign objective does not prevent the Court from conducting its own inquiry of the
policy’s real purpose).
164. Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273-74 (2003) (holding that colleges’
affirmative action policies must conduct individualized analyses of each applicant
and cannot use a rigid point system to advantage one class of applicants).
165. See Cordes, supra note 40, at 724-25 (concluding that Grutter and Gratz
mandate individualized evaluations of each applicant’s contribution to the campus’
diversity); see also VMI, 518 U.S. at 540-41 (concluding that VMI must conduct an
individual analysis of a female applicant’s qualifications that may enrich the student
body rather than excluding her based on gender stereotypes about her ability to
succeed in an adversative environment).
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quota system and the lack of individual evaluation of all applicants.
Rigid admissions standards that do not take account of the
individual’s fit with the educational institution are similar to VMI’s
admissions criteria that rejected female applicants based solely on
167
their sex.
To be constitutional, the affirmative action plan needs to include
an individualized determination regarding the fitness of each
applicant and his or her contribution to the diversity of the incoming
168
class. The evaluation of each student’s background would require
the admissions committee to look beyond the student’s gender to see
the contribution that he or she would make to the school rather than
relying on stereotypes about the inherent abilities, experiences, and
169
interests of male and female students.
b. Admissions officers must conduct an individualized evaluation of each
applicant including the consideration of gender neutral factors
To be substantially related to the college’s asserted objective, the
school’s affirmative action policy must consider all of an applicant’s
170
qualifications that could contribute to campus diversity.
The
consideration of gender-neutral factors, including potential major,
leadership experience, extracurricular activities, community service,
hardships, and other factors that provide a comparable “plus” to a
student’s application would increase the likelihood of a constitutional
171
program.
Examining gender-neutral factors of each applicant
ensures that students are evaluated based on their actual

166. Cf. Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1371 (“[M]ere racial balancing (i.e.
proportional racial representation for its own sake) is clearly unconstitutional.”
(citing Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547, 614 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting))).
167. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 541-42 (asserting that VMI cannot exclude all female
applicants simply because the average female might not meet VMI’s rigorous physical
standards).
168. Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-74 (requiring colleges to evaluate each individual’s
ability to contribute to the school’s diversity rather than assuming that a student will
make certain contributions based on an innate characteristic).
169. Cf. VMI, 518 U.S. at 541 (asserting that “[s]tate actors controlling gates to
opportunity, we have instructed, may not exclude qualified individuals based on
‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females’” (quoting
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982)).
170. Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271 (describing that all of a student’s attributes should
be considered in the admissions process and the presence of one single characteristic
does not automatically guarantee that the student will make that particular college
campus more diverse).
171. Cf. id. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the number of
points awarded to minority applicants was disproportionate to the number of points
awarded to students who contributed to the diversity of the school based on other
characteristics, like leadership).
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qualifications rather than assumptions based on their perceived
172
Admissions programs that
contribution because of their gender.
consider gender-neutral factors to add diversity to the class are more
legitimate in their goal of truly seeking diversity rather than trying to
achieve gender proportionality.
c. Affirmative action policies must not disproportionately benefit male
applicants
An affirmative action policy disproportionately benefits male
students when male applicants are awarded points based solely on
their gender. This factor correlates to the flexibility of the affirmative
action policy since a flexible plan that individually evaluates
candidates decreases the likelihood that a policy would
173
disproportionately benefit male students.
A mechanized process
that awards points to all male students based solely on their gender,
174
on the other hand, would fail this prong of the test.
A plan that
considered only an applicant’s gender would put females at an unfair
advantage in applying for admission. Though an affirmative action
policy benefiting males may only affect a small number of students,
the impact is substantial for those individuals. While many females
would not choose the adversative method of instruction used at VMI,
the impact for those individuals denied admission based solely on
175
their gender is enormous.
Similarly, a disproportionate point
advantage for male students based solely on their gender would
prevent qualified females from being offered admission solely
176
because they were born a certain gender.
By using gender as a
decisive factor in a student’s application, the college would deny

172. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 550 (explaining that some women are qualified and
would seek out the adversative method employed by VMI, yet they are denied this
opportunity based solely on assumptions made about their gender).
173. See id. at 540-41 (asserting that colleges’ individual analysis of each student’s
application takes account of their personal strengths and weaknesses and
consequently allows the admissions committee to admit the most qualified
applicants).
174. Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-74 (holding that colleges’ affirmative action policies
must evaluate each applicant based on their individual contribution to diversity).
175. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 542 (concluding that the question should be “not
whether ‘women or men should be forced to attend VMI’; rather, the question is
whether the Commonwealth can constitutionally deny to women who have the will
and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords”).
176. Cf. id. at 550-51 (arguing that female students must be evaluated according to
the same criteria as male applicants).
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more qualified applicants the chance to attend the institution to
177
satisfy an amorphous goal of gender proportionality.
d. Colleges must consider and reject gender neutral alternatives before
adopting an affirmative action policy that benefits male applicants
Many colleges and universities have used alternatives to formal
affirmative action policies, including targeted recruitment programs,
changes in advertising materials, and the addition of sports teams to
178
attract male students. While colleges should employ gender-neutral
alternatives before implementing a formal affirmative action policy,
the targeted recruitment policies that schools use are often based on
stereotypes and cannot be considered neutral alternatives.
Colleges’ reliance on gender stereotypes leads to a skewed
perception of gender roles, potentially exacerbating gender
179
discrimination in society.
The University of Michigan Law School
attempted to eliminate similar discrimination by adopting an
180
However,
admissions policy that fosters diversity-as-integration.
instead of facilitating integration, colleges’ reliance on stereotypes in
the implementation of recruitment policies, hampers progress by
constructing individuals’ roles in society based solely on their gender
181
without regard to their abilities.
The Supreme Court declared
reliance on gender stereotypes unconstitutional because each
individual should be evaluated based on his or her own
182
qualifications.
Therefore, in targeting admissions materials to
attract more male students, the college should not rely solely on
stereotypes; rather, these attempts should focus on providing
educational opportunities to all students.
177. Cf. id. (concluding that VMI could not deny admission to female applicants
based on gender stereotypes about their abilities when some female applicants may
be better qualified than the average male).
178. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text (describing colleges’ targeted
recruitment campaigns aimed at increasing the enrollment of male students).
179. Cf. VMI, 518 U.S. at 543 n.12 (explaining that stereotypes about women’s
abilities led to discriminatory policies that excluded women from various prestigious
professions, including law and medicine); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 729-30 (1982) (asserting that denying males admission to the nursing school
perpetuates the view that nursing is a female occupation, which leads to the denial of
other opportunities for women).
180. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-28 (2003); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra
note 114, at 1415 (arguing that diverse universities will encourage diversity in society
by “preparing students to work in ‘an increasingly diverse workforce’” and participate
in the community as informed American citizens).
181. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 541-42 (noting that judgments about people based on
overbroad generalizations are likely to “perpetuate historical patterns of
discrimination”).
182. See id. at 541 (holding that states must avoid the use of fixed notions about
gender roles when making classifications based on sex).
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To implement a plan that is substantially related to the goal of
diversity, the admissions committee must include flexible admissions
criteria that evaluate each individual’s unique contribution to the
183
class and the college community.
The Court required VMI to
evaluate each female applicant to determine her fitness for its unique
adversative environment and did not allow the school to reject all
female applicants simply because most would find the environment
184
unsuitable. Reliance on stereotypes about the proper role of men
and women or the perceived strengths and interests of the male sex
leads to segregation rather than the integrated community that
185
colleges should seek to foster.
Since colleges administrators have
not asserted a rationale for the affirmative action policy, other than
gender proportionality, and have relied on gender stereotypes, the
policies do not meet the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.
3. Applicability of the gender equality framework to challenges brought under
state anti-discrimination statutes
In addition to the federal remedies previously discussed, state
statutes that prohibit gender discrimination in educational
institutions provide a remedy for female students to challenge
186
Although
affirmative action policies that benefit male students.
187
courts often use analogous federal case law as instructive precedent,
state statutes can offer broader remedies to students to the extent
188
that the statutory language differs from Title IX.
For purposes of
analysis, this Section will look at the language of the Minnesota
189
Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), although the analysis would be
183. See supra notes 153, 165 and accompanying text (describing the need for
admissions criteria to evaluate each applicant based on his or her individual
qualifications).
184. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 550-51 (holding that VMI must admit qualified female
students).
185. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 114, at 1415-16 (explaining that the diversity-asintegration doctrine fosters community and eliminates discrimination in contrast to
the diversity-as-difference doctrine that relies on stereotypes about the backgrounds
of certain students).
186. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (arguing that state remedies are
important because some state statutes contain language that will allow private rights
of action against private colleges).
187. See Fahey v. Avnet Inc., 525 N.W.2d 568, 572 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that
state courts often use federal precedent of analogous federal statutes to analyze
claims under the MHRA).
188. Cf. Todd v. Ortho Biotech Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
that although the courts often look to Title VII case law, in the context of sex
discrimination in the employment setting, when construing the MHRA, the court will
apply the plain language of the statute when it differs from developments in federal
case law).
189. The author uses the MHRA for purposes of analysis since this Act had the
largest body of case law construing the scope of the Act.
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similar under other state statutes with prohibitions against sex
190
discrimination in educational institutions.
Because state statutes were enacted to offer additional protection
191
for students, it is likely that courts would conduct a searching
inquiry to examine whether the school had a compelling state
interest in diversity rather than an interest in merely attempting to
192
balance the colleges’ proportion of male and female students.
A
mere attempt at gender balancing would clearly fail under strict
scrutiny, especially if a court forced a college to articulate support for
its assertion that gender diversity constitutes a compelling state
193
interest.
To pass constitutional muster, a court would require
colleges to assert a particular need to implement an affirmative
action policy for male students that was free from gender stereotypes
194
about the capabilities of men and women.
Additionally, a college would need to articulate that this plan was
195
narrowly tailored to achieve its goal of gender diversity.
While a
plan that awards points to male applicants based solely on their
gender would clearly fail this prong of the test, other practices may
196
also violate state statutes.
For example, some colleges have
instituted a policy that extends a phone call to all admitted male
students, but school representatives do not call all of the accepted
197
female students.
The MHRA articulates that it is “an unfair
190. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-307 (2006) (prohibiting educational
institutions from excluding, expelling, limiting, or otherwise discriminating against
prospective students or current students on the basis of sex); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 20-13-22 (2001) (declaring that it is unfair and discriminatory for educational
institutions to include or expel students on the basis of sex).
191. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.02 (2001) (stating that “[i]t is the public policy of this
state to secure for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination . . . in education
because of . . . sex . . .”).
192. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to accept a school’s asserted objective for a policy that distinguishes
among applicants based on sex).
193. Cf. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga. (Johnson I), 106 F. Supp. 2d
1362, 1376 n.10 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (rejecting a gender affirmative action policy where
the school could not support its asserted objective of the need for an affirmative
action policy with substantive educational data), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
194. Cf. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (holding that
although the school may articulate a benign purpose for the policy, courts must
evaluate the plan to see if “the alleged objective is the actual purpose underlying the
discriminatory classification”).
195. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing that state courts often
look to federal precedent analyzing analogous federal statutes; therefore, the state
court would likely apply the same level of scrutiny as the federal courts).
196. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1989) (rejecting the
University of California’s use of a quota system to achieve racial diversity).
197. See Peter Y. Hong, Gender Gap Growing on College Campuses, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2004, A11 (quoting the Vice President of Admissions at Santa Clara University
stating that “[w]e make a special pitch to [males] to talk about the benefits of Santa
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discriminatory practice to exclude, expel, or otherwise discriminate
against a person seeking admission as a student . . . because of . . .
198
sex.” Thus, this type of preferential treatment to a particular class
of applicants based solely on their sex could constitute the “other”
type of discrimination that the statute expressly prohibits. While such
an admissions practice might not violate Title IX, it would likely
violate the MHRA, and similar state statutes, because of the
additional level of protection that these statutes provide.
State statutes, like the MHRA, can accomplish the goals of VMI and
Hogan by creating educational environments that allow all students to
achieve their potential. State courts can achieve the underlying
purpose of the decisions in VMI and Hogan—individualized analysis
of students based on their actual qualifications regardless of
stereotypes—by interpreting their state statutes and constitutions to
provide greater protection from gender discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Due to the differences between racial affirmative action policies
and affirmative action programs that benefit male students, courts
must use a different framework to evaluate affirmative action policies
benefiting male students. Courts must analyze this issue differently
because males have not historically suffered from discrimination, and
the Supreme Court has not identified males as a discrete and insular
minority who should receive a greater level of protection. Therefore,
while the opinions of Grutter and Gratz provide some guidance to
courts in confronting the issue of gender affirmative action
programs, the analysis of these opinions should not be wholly
adopted and instead the Court’s gender discrimination cases should
govern the analysis.
The opinions of VMI and Hogan provide a framework that requires
schools to articulate a specific justification for policies that
discriminate based on sex and that will not defer to colleges’ mere
assertion that the school needs gender proportionality.
The
proposed framework evaluates the affirmative action policies based
on (1) whether the college relies on gender stereotypes and
(2) whether the aim of the school’s policy is diversity rather than
gender proportionality. College administrators have not articulated
substantive pedagogical justifications for the need to use affirmative

Clara, as we do for other underrepresented groups” due to “fear that lopsided malefemale ratios will hurt the social life and diverse classrooms [used] as selling points”).
198. MINN. STAT. § 363A.13 (2001).
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action to increase the percentage of males on campus.
Undergraduate institutions have instead used targeted recruitment
programs that rely on gender stereotypes to enroll a class with equal
199
proportions of male and female students.
While colleges should
encourage innovative thought and progress, institutions with
affirmative action policies benefiting males are charting a course
toward the past by promoting gender stereotypes and inequality.

199. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text (explaining that college
administrators relied on social concerns about the gender imbalance rather than
asserting a legitimate pedagogical objective for the policy).

